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FEDERALISM TO AN ADVANTAGE: THE DEMISE OF
STATE BLUE SKY LAWS UNDER THE UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT
by
MARIANNE M. JENNINGS,- BRUCE

K.

CHILDERS"

AND RONALD

J.

KUDLA"**

I. INTRODUCTION
They come at an opportune time. "They" are the changes to the Uniform
Securities Act.' Although some of the changes are perfunctory, the significant
changes have a fascinating common thread running through them. That
fascinating thread is federalism. Changes in the Act could move regulation
away from the hands of the states and make federal registration, more or less, a
ticket for sales without state approval. The changes are not without opposition. This article will discuss the changes, the reactions of particular concerned
groups and the perceived effects of such changes.
II. THE EXISTING REGULATORY SCHEME

A.

The Two-Tier System

Currently, a two-tier system for the regulation of securities sales exists. At
the federal level, there is the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). At the state level, some thirty-six states, two territories and the District of Columbia 3 have adopted the Uniform Securities
Act 4 (hereinafter USA). The two-tier system exists because the Securities Act
of 1933 specifically provides that state securities laws are not preempted by
that Act.' Because of the absence of preemption, registration compliance at the
*Marianne Moody Jennings is a professor in the College of Business at Arizona State University and served
as a gubernatorial appointee to the Arizona Corporation Commission from 1984-1985. B.S., 1974; J.D.,
1977, Brigham Young University.
**Bruce K. Childers was formerly an associate Professor in the College of Business'at Arizona State University. He is currently an attorney in private practice, specializing in real estate syndications and small
business financing. B.B.A., 1970, North Texas State University; M.B.A., 1971, J.D., 1974, Texas Tech.
***Ronald J.Kudla is an Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Wisconsin. B.S.M.E., 1969,
Pennsylvania State University, M.B.A., 1974, Ph.D., 1977, University of Pittsburgh.
'NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS.
2

Uniform Securities Act of 1985.

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77 bbbb (1933).

3

Some states have adopted only portions of the Act. Other states have used the act as a model, but these
states and territories follow the general theory and idea of the Act: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming; I BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) § 5501 (1985).
'NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Uniform Securities Act, (1956).
'See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976).
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federal level is not necessarily compliance with the state "blue sky" laws.'
However, some states have adopted a position that if the SEC approves a
registration, then that registration is approved for state purposes.7 These states
have voluntarily relinquished their regulatory rights in favor of federal standards for registration. 8 Other states9 not only require SEC approval (at least impliedly), but their regulation goes even further than the SEC disclosure standards. These stricter states0 review potential offerings for their quality.
B.

The Two-Tier Philosophy at the State Level

In those states with the strictest standards, some form of "merit review" is
followed. The Securities Act of 1933" imposes a requirement of full and timely
disclosure of all information relevant to the investment decision. Some states
examine offerings from an antifraud perspective in addition to that of full
disclosure. In other states there is "merit review" of registration offerings full and timely disclosure is not the standard for registration approval. In addition to full disclosure, the offering must be "fair, just and equitable"' 2 to investors. Section 306(2)(v) is the portion of the USA that allows review by these
"'Blue sky" laws are state securities laws. The term was coined in a judicial opinion which labeled some investments "speculative schemes which have no more bases than so many feet of 'blue sky."' Hall v. GeigerJones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917). More details on blue sky law history can be found in Loss & COWETr,
BLUE SKY LAW (1958).
'New York and New Jersey are examples. N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 359-ff(l) (1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-60(c)
(West 1967).
'In these states, no state official examines the offering or its documentation. The only requirement for
registration is proof of SEC approval. The following states are those that have adopted § 303 of the USA Registration by Coordination: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 8-6-6 (1975); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.090
(1972); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANNOT. § 67-1243 (1983); California, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25111 (West 1977);
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-486 (1985); Guam, GUAM GOVT"CODE § 45303 (1982); Idaho, IDAHO
CODE § 30-1420 (1972); Indiana, IND. CODE § 23-2-1-4 (1982): Iowa, IOWA CODE § 502.206 (1983); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1257 (1971); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. § 292.360 (1972); Maine, MAINE REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10403 (1985); Maryland, MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-503 (1957); Massachusetts, MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. § 302 (West 1975); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 451.703 (1979); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. § 80A.10 (1985); Mississippi, MISS- CODE ANN. § 75-71-403 (1972); Missouri, Miss. REV. STAT_ §
409.303 (1978); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-204 (1985); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1106
(1977); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421 -B: 13 (1955); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-7
(1983); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-26C (1981); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.091
(Baldwin 1985); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit., § 303 (198 1); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 205 (1984);
Puerto Rico § 873 (1985); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-840, 35-1-850 (1976); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-31-18.1 (1975); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-105 (1980); Utah, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 61-1-9 (1953); Virginia, VA. CODE § 13.1-509 (1984); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §
21.20.180 (1983); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 32-3-303 (1984); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 551.25 (1983);
Wyoming, WYO. STAT. § 17-4-109 (1977).
'Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas and Vermont. Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes:New Importancefor an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689, 803-11 (1982).
"Most commentators include California, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri and Wisconsin as the strictest
states. Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements, 1976 WIs. L. REV. 79, 86 n. 46
(1976), (hereinafter cited as Goodkind).
"15 U.S.C. §§ 77-77bbbb (1933).
"Maryland is an example of an antifraud/disclosure state, see, MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-502
(1972) (Registrations by notification), and MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-503 (1975). (Registration by
coordination - effective upon SEC registration.)
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss3/3
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standards. Under that section, authority is given to deny a registration that
could or will tend "to work a fraud upon purchasers."' 3
Regardless of the language chosen by a state in its adoption of the USA,
those administrators responsible for registration in "merit" states have great
discretion. In implementing their merit standards, these states have adopted
the following criteria (either by regulation or policy) to be used in a "merit
review"; they determine whether or not:
1. Equity capital invested is insufficient in relation to the total capitalization that will exist after the offering is complete; 4
2. Excessive amounts of "cheap stock" have been issued to promoters and
insiders at prices significantly less than the eventual public offering
price;"
3. Excessive numbers of options and warrants have been issued or will be
issued in relation to the total capital structure which will exist after the
offering is complete; 6
""Fair, just and equitable" is a generic standard found in some state statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
517.09 (7) (West 1972), "... . sale of such securities would be fair, just and equitable ..." Other states have
adopted negative language instead, such as "the sale of securities ... would be unfair or inequitable to the
purchasers." ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1921 (3) (1967). The Uniform Securities Act of 1985 offers states
alternative language: ". . . the offering has worked or tended to work a fraud upon purchasers or would so
operate;" "I... the offering is being made on terms that are unfair, unjust, or inequitable;]" §§ 306 (2) (v) and
306 (2) [(v)l (1985).
(1974) (requires 15% investment up to $1,000,000 and
"For example, see Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 30-52.080 (I)
10% after that); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 3.05 (1984) (adopts NASAA's guidelines Corporation Commission);
TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § 113.3 (1984); (requires a 10% of equity capital investment). For example, Arizona
has adopted specific percentages for the required minimum of equity capital invested. That state provides for
the following schedule:
10% of the first $200,000.00
5% of the second $200,000.00
1% of the balance. ARiz. ADMIN. COMP. R. § R 14-4-107A (1984).
"See Mo.ADMIN. CODE § 30-52.070(B) (1984) (limits cheap stock to 50%); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 3.04 (1984)
(adopts NASAA guidelines which limit cheap stock to 60%); ARIz. ADMIN. COMP. R. § R 14-4-105 B (1984),
which limits "promotional securities" to 15% of the outstanding securities (those that will be outstanding at
the end of the offering). "Promotional securities" are defined as
[slecurities issued for services rendered, patents, copyrights or other intangibles, the value of which
has not been established to the satisfaction of the Commission by appraisals, by evidence of amounts
paid by others for substantially similar services or property, by evidence of a bona fide offer to purchase such services or property, or by other evidence, or for a consideration substantially less in
amount than the consideration for which such securities are proposed to be sold to the public. ...
6
Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 30-52.060 (1984); Texas allows for the escrow of cheap stock, TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7
§ 113.3(5) (1983) (limits options and warrants to 10% of aggregate offering and restricts them to 5 years);
Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 3.03(c) (1983) (limits number and value of warrants and options to 20% of the total
number of shares that will be outstanding after the offer and 20% of their value); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 §
113.3(01) (1983) (provides for complicated original and on-going percentage limitations); ARiz. ADMIN.
COMP. R. § R-14-4-106 (1984) allows such options, warrants and rights to purchase so long as:
1. The number of shares covered thereby does not exceed 20% of the number of securities to be outstanding at the completion of the proposed public offering.
2. The initial exercise price is reasonably related to the public offering price.
3. They do not exceed ten years in duration.
4. The prospectus to be used in connection with the proposed public offering contains a full
reasons for their grant.
as to the terms and1986
Publisheddisclosure
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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4. A proposed public offering price too high in relation to the market
price, if one exists, or in relation to the issuer's earnings, or history,
etc., (if a marketprice does not exist);"
5. Excessive underwriter's commissions and/or selling expenses have
been incurred;'"
6. The shares being offered to the public carry inequitable voting rights; 9
7. Historical earnings are insufficient to cover interest on debt securities,
or to pay preferred dividends on the equity preferred shares which
would be issued.20

In addition to these seven common factors, most regulators in merit states
have a discretionary "miscellaneous" category. In the "miscellaneous"
category are items such as poor financial condition, the improbability of success of the business, and unfair transactions by insiders.2' Some states impose
financial and experience requirements on promoters before their offerings can
be registered.22
"Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 30-52.050 (1980); (limits price to 25 times the average annual net earnings per share);
Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.02(2), 3.02(l)(a) (1984) (price must be "reasonably related" and "not exceed 25 times
its average annual net earnings per share for the last 3 years"); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § 113.3(2) (1983)
(allows examination of price earnings ratio over the past years).
"8 Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 30-52.040 (1982) (1590 limit); WIS. STAT. § 551.28(0 (1983); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 3.01
(1973) (Commissions limited to 10% and other expenses to 15% of the aggregate offering price); ARK. ADMIN. REG. R14-4-108 (1972) provides:
No issuer shall incur a liability which must be paid by the issuer as a selling expense in connection
with the sale of a public issuance greater than 15% of the amount of said issue actually sold to the
public.
B. Selling expenses shall include commissions, salaries, advertising and all other expenses directly or
indirectly incurred in connection with the sale of securities ....
Some states also prohibit officers and directors from earning commissions, see, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. COMP.
REG. § R 14-4- 11 (1972); UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 306(2)(F) (1958) prohibits "unreasonable amounts".
'"Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 30-52.110 (1974) (unfair or disproportionate); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 3.07(a)(1), (6)
(1984) (Prohibits giving no voting rights or unequal voting rights); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3(6) (1984)
(prohibits "disproportionate" rights).
10Mo. ADMIN. CODE §30-52.120 (1984) (three year test); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 3.06(l) (1984) (net earnings for
last 3 years would be insufficient to cover debt interest).
"In many states, the "miscellaneous" category is not codified anywhere. The application is discretionary and
if written is in the form of a policy statement. Those policies are recorded in I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
5151-5381 (1984). Furthermore, the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., (NASAA)
has adopted certain statements of policy, I BLUE SKY L. REP., CCH J1 5151-52 (1983). Many states have
adopted those policy statements either formally or informally. For example, see, BLUE SKY L. REP. 9605
(1984) in which Arizona takes the following position: "NASAA Statements of Policy. The Securities Division subscribes to the Statements of Policy adopted by the North American Securities Administrators
Association, Inc. (NASAA) relating to the registration of securities in Arizona except where in conflict with
a state rule or regulation."
For other examples of state regulations, see, e.g., IowA ADMIN. CODE §§ 510-50.33 to .40 (1983), as
reported in I BLUE SKY L. REP.
25,434-25.440. Iowa requires a promoter's investment of at least 10%;
limits offering expenses to 7% of the first $500,000 (aggregate) and 5% of any aggregate price above that;
uses the 3-year earnings test for price; limits commissions to 10% and options or warrants to 20% and requires cheap stock to go into escrow for 10 months.
"For example, in Texas, promoters of real estate syndications must contribute at least $50,000 to the syndicate and must have a minimum of two years executive experience in real estate. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, §
117.2 (a) and (b) (1982).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss3/3
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C.

THE DEMISE OF STATE BLUE SKY LAWS

Criticisms of Existing State Regulation

One of the reasons for the dramatic changes in the 1984 version of the
USA is the recent and substantial criticism of state laws and regulations, and
how they are administered.23 The problems subject to this criticism have been
analyzed by many, but remained unresolved, and of vital concern to the entrepreneurial sector of our economy. 4
1. Lack of Incentive (Compensation) for Officers and Directors
A major criticism of merit review is the strong control it puts on the compensation of officers and directors. Commissions,25 warrants, options26 and promotional stock 7 restrictions are examples of state methods for controlling compensation. The claimed result is a loss of incentive or motivation for entrepreneurs. Even those offerings approved in merit states have usually been
negotiated - the promoters and the administrator negotiate terms acceptable
to the administrator. Terms acceptable to the administrator tend to be those
that are most protective of the investor.28
2. Favoritism for Established and Large Businesses - Barriers to Entrepreneurs
A second criticism of the merit review process is that it inherently favors
established businesses and so carefully scrutinizes new businesses that the new
businesses cannot raise sufficient capital to succeed with their ventures.29 This
-riticism is substantiated by the fact that nearly all states have a registration
3
A cursory review of the pertinent literature reveals the following articles: Hurley and Green, Florida's
Response to the Needfor Uniformity in Federal and State Securities Registration Exemption Requirements,
12 FLA. STATE U.L. REV. 309 (1984); Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 (1982);
Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1447 (1969); Bateman,
State Securities Registration: An Unresolved Dilemma and a Suggestion for the Federal Securities Code, 27
5w. L.J. 759 (1973); Makens, Who Speaks for the Investor? An Evaluation of the Assault on Merit Regularion, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 435 (1984); Mofsky and Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REV.
367 (1977); Sargent, The Challenge to Merit Regulation - Part , 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 276 (1984); Blue Sky
Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689 (1982);
3oodkind, see supra, note 10. In Illinois, a well-known merit state, the legislature substantially eliminated
nerit review in 1983. Wisconsin and Iowa had a moderate reduction in merit authority. Wis. Sec. Bill. July
1983, 2-4; Iowa, H.B. No. 514, 15 SEC. REG.& L. REP. (BNA) 963 (1983).
'See, e.g., Arizona Corporation Commission, Hearings on Merit Review, Sept. 1984, available through
kKRON LAW REVIEW.

'See note 18 and accompanying text.
'See note 16 and accompanying text.
'See notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
'Although the Uniform Securities Act § 306(a) (1958) and most state laws allow merit administrators to
;sue stop orders, most offerings are either negotiated, resulting in a package acceptable to the administrator,
ir are withdrawn. Few offerings are actually denied registration. For an evaluation of the role of adainistrators see Honig, Massachusetts Securities Regulation: An Evolving Matrix, B. Bus. J. Nov. 1983 at
0-12. See also, NASAA Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 5294, at
2.373-12.374, n.I.
-- J. MOFSKY. BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS, 12, 36-7 (1971), (hereinafter cited as
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
MOFSKY).
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exemption for securities listed on national stock exchanges." The requirements
for exchange listing are so stringent that no new company would ever qualify
for this type of streamlined/exempt offering. 3 Even after one public offering,
newer firms would have trouble meeting the exchange exemptions because of
the substantial earnings required.
Many merit states use a double standard for new companies as opposed to
companies with an earnings record. Companies without an earnings record
will be subjected to stricter registration requirements. Other states allow the
offering to go through, but subject the offeror to impounds" and escrows.34
Young companies are strictly scrutinized and many with good products and
services are denied registration because of their lack of size and earnings
history. Two harms stem from this apparently inherent bias. First, investors
are denied the opportunity to invest in a high risk but potentially profitable
venture. Second, in many cases the fledgling company with a good idea but no
money, will be unable to raise capital by a means other than a securities offering, and therefore society loses a service or a product, as well as the economic
boost provided by a new firm.3
3. Affectation of Price and Risk Correlation
Merit review administrators are, in effect, controlling the amount of risk
they will allow to be passed on to the public. In some instances, they decide the
'"See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.402(a)(8) (1978), which exempts securities listed or approved for listing on
the New York, American and Midwest Stock Exchanges. The statute empowered Missouri's administrator
to add exchanges and the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange was later added. Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 30-54.060
(1980).
3
'For example, New York Stock Exchange eligibility requires: (a) 2,000 holders of 100 shares or more; (b)
1,100,000 shares publicly held; (c) market value of publicly held shares of at least $18,000,000. The Exchange does have an alternative method of establishing eligibility - (1)$18,000,000 in net tangible assets;
(b) earning power before federal taxes of $2,500,000 in the last year and $2,000,000 in each of the two years
preceding. The Exchange can also impose additional requirements for trading shares held in one concentrated geographic area. New York Stock Exchange Equity Products Listed Company Manual Supplement
#2, §§ 101.00-104.00 (1985).
32

One restriction is to require the offering price of the security to be near the price promoters and other insiders have paid for the same stock. See. e.g., Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 3.02(2) (1984).
33
For example ARiz. ADMIN. COMp R. § R 14-4-112 (1985) allows the impoundment of funds as a condition
to registration. Although the funds are held in a bank, they cannot be released until the administrator makes
the decision to do so. The maximum time limit isone year. Id. at R 14-4-113. Iowa also has such a provision.
See, IOWA ADMIN- CODE § 510-50.31 (502) (1983).
"For example, ARIz. ADMIN. COMP. R. § R-14-4-119 allows the administrator to hold the stock of promoters
in escrow as a condition of registration. The stock can be released from escrow after a petitioner establishes a
satisfactory earning record of at least one year for the solvent offeror. See also, IOWA ADMIN. CODE §
510-50.37 (502) (1983) and Texas, TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3(5) (1983).
3
1See
MOFSKY. supra note 29, at 26-7. Congress had addressed the problems of small business financing. For
example in its Omnibus Small Business Capital Formation Act of 1980, Congress authorized the SEC "[T]o
cooperate with any association composed of duly constituted representatives of State governments whose
primary assignment is the regulation of securities business within those States" for purposes of "the development of a uniform exemption from registration for small issuers which can be agreed upon among several
States or between the states and the Federal Government." 15 U.S.C. § 77s(C)(I) and (3)(c) (1982). The result
was SEC cooperation with the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) and 6the
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss3/3
development of Regulation D (see notes 79-88 infra and accompanying text).
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risk cannot be passed along and a registration is either denied or withdrawn. In
other instances, they attempt to manipulate the risk in favor of the investor.
Risk is reduced through the seven factors generally used by merit review administrators. 6 Violation of even one of the criteria employed under the "fair,
just and equitable" standard allows administrators to deny a registration, or at
least to require a reduction in an offering price they deem too high in relation
to the market price or to an earnings history if there is no market price.37 If,
upon release of the securities, public perception of the issue is more favorable
than that of the administrator, the market creates a "hot issue."38 These hot
issues indicate several side effects. First, an immediate and significant rise in
price is an indication of underpricing - that the issuer did not raise as much
capital as the public was willing to invest. Second, secondary sales allow initial
investors to make a profit because of the price increase and that profit is lost to
the issuer who had offered the underpriced stock.39 In short, merit regulation of
price is, in effect, artificial price control and manipulation of the free market.
Market force is significant in the minds of investors, issuers and legislative
bodies.' Manipulation or elimination of the effect of efficient market forces is
heresy to the financial community. Of key impact upon market efficiency is
"full disclosure" rather than a determination of an offering's merits or that it is
"fair, just and equitable."'"
The political forces that have joined in the merit review battle have won
legislative support for the theory that a tough merit review state will keep bad
businesses out, ostensibly because selling questionable offerings is difficult in
an unfavorable regulatory climate. 2
16See notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
37
See note 17 and accompanying text. Wisconsin limits the offeror's proposed offering price to 25 times
report earnings. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 3.02 (1) (1970). Regulations from other states are similar or more stringent. See, Goodkind, supra note 10, at 96-97.
"1A "hot issue" is one that will sell for a price well above the initial asking price because it is perceived to be
worth more (or potentially worth more) than the asking price at issuance.
"Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1447, 1486 (1969).
"SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE WHEAT REPORT, (CCH) (1969); The report, directed by SEC
Commissioner Francis M. Wheat, examines the issues of dissemination of information through registration
and other means.
"Since the federal law provides for full disclosure, many efficient market theorists support the use of federal
registration only, and assert that state regulation is neither needed or wanted. (The Efficient Market Theory
holds that markets function best when investors have full information, and that full information serves to
control stock prices.)
' 2For example, the statement of Jack Bailey, Iowa Development Commission, 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
1882 (Oct. 7, 1983) provides as follows:
The decision to locate in a state is based on fundamentals such as the availability of human and
material resources, cost of building, leasing or owning facilities, transportation, state tax or workers'
benefits structure, attractiveness of the community, and the generation of ideas that give rise to the
business opportunity. Financing is an element to consider but the blue sky laws have never been a
decisive factor in my experience or those of the attorneys whom I have queried. This argument has
been raised in states where merit regulation has been under recent attack as the basis for excluding
certain "high tech" companies from developing in those states. A far more likely scenario is that those
states do not have an existing industrial base or a strong program of research in their universities that
are the bases for development of that type of company, and these factors, combined with the elements
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
for a location
decision determine 1986
where high tech companies spring forth.

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 3, Art. 3
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:3

4. Increased Costs
Merit review states increase business costs because there is more paperwork, and more attorneys' and accountants' fees to contend with than in other
states. SEC registration is also costly, and even under the USA, each state applies different standards. Although there is a uniform application to register
securities among the 50 states, there are no uniform merit standards. Issuers
are forced to bargain with regulators on a state-by-state basis in order to get an
offering approved.43
5. Arbitrary Administrators
A "fair, just and equitable" standard is indefinite. These are words begging for interpretation and open the door for differing application. Personal
prejudices, ' discretion, and the state regulatory climate all influence whether a
registration is approved or denied. 5 A registration can be approved in one
merit state and denied (or withdrawn) in another merit state."6 Administrators
often claim that they "smell a fraud" in evaluating offerings under merit standards. The regulatory requirements are met, but the administrator has an unfavorable "gut feeling" about the offering. 7 This "gut feeling" leads to a more
intense investigation, whereby the administrator delves into the non-routine or
miscellaneous factors that merit administrators consider but which are not
specifically delineated. 8 Some state administrators even have a reputation for
denying registrations to those engaged in particular industries. 9
4

Bateman, supra note 23, at 781.
"See, Bateman, supra note 23, at 778; MOFSKY. supra note 29, at 16; Bloomenthal, supra note 23, at 1479.
'5 L. Loss & E. COWETr, BLUE SKY LAW 5-13 (1958). "A midwestern administrator replied that he looked on
uranium issues with a 'jaundiced eye"' and disapproved them "unless they are of such a nature that we
might be tempted to invest our own money in them." Id. at 77. See also, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 5294 n. I
(Sept. 21, 1983) (NASSA comment on tax shelter offerings).
'Even in the so-called "merit review" states, the standards for merit review are not always applied.
Although merit states on the books, in application they are full disclosure states. See supra note 12.
'These "gut feelings" generally stem from the regulators' experiences. Regulators have usually worked in
either state or federal registration for some time and their experiences may allow them to detect more
sophisticated frauds. However, "IsItate administrators are no better able than anyone else to evaluate the
riskiness of a given venture. If they were, it is unlikely that they would be administering the securities law
rather than maximizing their wealth in a more profitable way." Mofsky, Reform of the Florida Securities
Law, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. I, 30 (1974). See also Edwards, California Measures the Uniform Securities Act
Against Its Corporate Securities Law, 15 Bus. LAw. 814 (1960), in which Edwards observes: "The commissioner had established specific little rules that had to be followed by the deputies who could not really exercise basic judgment on the merits of the security as a whole." Id. at 823.
"See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Many who support merit review make the point that the offerors can avoid administrators, as well as difficulty in raising capital simply by qualifying for one of the
state's registration exemptions. There are several problems with raising capital through exempt offerings:
(1)There are generally limitations on the number of offerees and purchasers;
(2) Investors have greater bargaining power and may demand more control thus depriving the offeror
of discretion (and in some cases control) in the business venture:
(3) Investors in exempt offerings are more difficult to find;
14) There is public perception of higher risks with exempt offerings and the price is affected accordingly.
MOFSKY. supra note 29, at 21-26; Bateman, supra note 23, at 777-78.
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6. Merit Review Doesn't Work
a. Theory of Ineffectiveness
Perhaps the most serious criticism of merit review (as well as the most researched) is that it doesn't work. Despite all the administrators, mutual funds,
and registrations, there are frauds in both merit and non-merit states. Indeed,
many of the truly bizarre frauds are committed by people who don't have a
first place, therefore, the greater the fraud the easier it is
mind to register in the
5°
to get away with it.
Many have advanced the theory that front-end regulatory activity is ineffective. For example, merit states did not catch the Equity Funding5' or National Student Marketing"5 frauds. However, strict and active enforcement in
the area of fraud is a necessary function because of the criminal nature of such
schemes. In other words, the theory is that stricter enforcement and harsher
penalties do more to deter fraud than the merit review process.53
b. Quantitative Evaluations of Merit Review
Several studies have evaluated the efficacy of merit review on a quantitative basis. The first study was done by Goodkind on the efficacy of Wisconsin's merit review procedures.5 4 Goodkind analyzed corporate issuers who applied for registration in Wisconsin from 1968 to 1971." The corporate issuers'
financial performances were analyzed using three measures: stockprice, book
value, and dividends.5

6

Based on his limited findings,5 7 Goodkind concluded

regulators develop a hostile attitude toward those types of ventures with which their enforcement division
has had the problems of fraud. For example, a NASAA opinion of tax shelter offerings followed substantial
fraud in those offerings. I BLUE SKY L. REP (CCH) 5294 n.1 (Sept. 21, 1983).
'0Bloomenthal, supra note 39, at 1481.
"In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 438 F.Supp 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977). In this scam, Equity Funding's
earnings and assets were inflated by selling reinsurers bogus life insurance policies. Equity presented an image of being a dynamic organization and even many financial advisors were duped into advising their clients
to invest. See, In re Boston Co. Inst. Inv., Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 181,705 (1978).
2
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). In this scam, National Student

Marketing overstated its profits substantially in its financial statement, (infact they had a loss). This type of
conduct is generally caught at the state level because additional documentation would not have been required for the CPA audited financials.
"W. PRIFTI, SECURITIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS, 6-36.
-'Goodkind, supra note 10, at 107-23.
"Goodkind examined both those offerings that were eventually registered and those that were withdrawn.
Traditionally, there are not denials of registration in merit states. The offerors usually withdraw after comments from the administrator or after the failure of administrator and offeror to reach an agreement on the
terms of the offering. Id. at 107-23.
'Goodkind, supra note 10, at 122. Naturally, Goodkind included information for those companies that failed.
Using his definition of failure (a 75% or greater loss of market value), 23.5% of the issuers who were not approved failed within 3 years after the failure to register. Id. at 121. The point has been made that failures
may be an effect of not being able to raise sufficient capital rather than an indication that the merit administrators were correct in their judgments. See Note, State Securities Regulation: Investor Protectionv.
Freedom of the Market Place, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 947, 970 n.162 (1977).
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1986
supra note 10, at 122.
"See, Goodkind,

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 3, Art. 3
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:3

that Wisconsin's merit review system was effective in protecting investors
from investments that would result in severe losses. 8 However, Goodkind did
note that his conclusions were based on averages and that there were issuers at
the top end (those with the great risk), who were not approved but who, in fact,
performed very well regardless."
Goodkind's study has been criticized as an "effects" study - that it examined the effects of merit review on the companies involved, but did no
analysis of the cost of the merit review process in its operation and lost investment opportunity." The study has been criticized as one that looked for
benefits on the investor side, but which did not examine the costs of merit
review, its economic effects, or its uniformity of application.6'
The next study was not published until 1982. This was the Walker and
Hadaway study of Texas' merit review system.62 This study was also limited to
corporate issuers"' and scrutinized the financial performance of those issuers
whose registrations were withdrawn from Texas registration during the period
from 1975 to 1980." The conclusion of the Walker-Hadaway study is the same
as Goodkind's - that merit review is effective.65
The final study to date was the Kudla and Jennings evaluation of
Arizona's merit review system." Although criticized for its conclusions 6 and
for the response rate on its survey of withdrawn companies,68 the study offers
"Goodkind used the following language: "For those who have attacked the rules [Wisconsin's merit standards] as unnecessary restrictions on free enterprise and unwarranted limitation on promoters' profits, the
results provide a convincing rebuttal." Goodkind, supra note 10, at 123.
1"... the study concealed tremendous internal variations. Hidden by the averages set forth herein are many
issuers who performance was exceptionally good despite their inability to obtain registration in Wisconsin,
and some registrants which failed miserably. The range for both groups is large enough to suggest that the
present rules [merit standards) even though empirically justifiable, leave room for improvement." Goodkind,
supra note 10, at 123.
WMofsky and Tollison criticized Goodkind's methodology as "flawed."See Mofsky and Tollison, supra note
23, at 376.
"Id. at 370-37 1; Makens, Who Speaks for the Investor?An Evaluation of the Assault on Merit Regulation,
13 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 454-55 (1984).
2
Walker and Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of the Efficiency of Texas Merit
Standards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651 (1982).
"3Goodkind evaluated corporate issuers also. See Goodkind, supra note 10, at 108.
" Walker and Hadaway, supra note 62, at 659-662.
"A criticism of both Goodkind as well as that of Walker and Hadaway is that none studied the effect of
merit review on partnership offerings. Since corporate issuers are only one part of total registrants, no study
is complete without partnership data. However, in fairness to both studies it is very difficult to collect the
pertinent financial data on registered as well as withdrawn partnerships. With corporate issuers, it is at least
possible to check exchange data. Kudla and Jennings, An Evaluation Of The Efficacy Of Merit Review By
Arizona's Securities Division (hereinafter cited as Kudla and Jennings). A copy of this unpublished study is

available through

AKRON LAW REVIEW.

"The Federal Trade Commission attempted a study in 1984 which remained uncompleted because of extensive criticism from both NASAA and the American Bar Association.
"See, Makens, Who Speaks for the Investor? An Evaluation of the Assault on Merit Regulation, 13 U.
BALT. L. REV. 420, 456-57 (1984).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss3/3
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the first negative evaluation of merit review.69
The study focused on registration of common stocks in Arizona during
the years 1976 to 1979. A total of 350 registration applications were reviewed.
Of the 350 files examined, 260 registrations were approved and 90 were
withdrawn." As noted above, denials are rare, but in the 350 files examined,
denials were non-existent. It cannot be concluded from these statistics that
Arizona's merit review system issues no denials and is therefore ineffective.
Many of the withdrawals occurred because of an amendment or comment letter 7 strongly indicating that a denial was forthcoming. Furthermore, many in
the regulatory system make the argument that "bad issues" are kept out of
Arizona simply because of its reputation as a "tough" merit review state, as opposed to simple disclosure state. 2
Of the 90 withdrawals, only twelve companies withdrew on their own initiative. For example, six companies withdrew their registration solely because
of poor market conditions. Two issuers simply decided not to go through with
the issue and withdrew. One firm withdrew its SEC application and correspondingly withdrew all state applications. Two companies withdrew because
the expense of the offering became too high. Finally, another company
withdrew because of timing and procedure problems. The remaining seventyeight companies withdrew their registrations because of comment and amendment letters received from a reviewer in the Securities Division.73
'A copy of this unpublished study is available through

AKRON LAW REVIEW.

'See Kudla and Jennings, supra note 65, at 15. The focus on common stocks results in narrow scope, but
financial data on limited partnerships is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.
111d. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-197 (1967) provides procedurally for a comment letter containing corrections and suggestions.
"Discussion of Possible Amendments to the Securities Act, Arizona A.R.S. 44-1871 & 44-1921 Before the
Arizona Corporation Commission, at p. 17 (Sept. 26, 1984) (statement of Commissioner Royce Griffin). A
copy is available through AKRON LAW REVIEW.
11Id. at 16. The following chart summarizes the reasons for withdrawal.
REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL
REASON
NUMBER OF FIRMS
Excessive dilution
9
Incomplete information
8
Inadequate financial statements
7
Lack of experience
6
Poor market conditions
6
Too high a price
5
SEC withheld approval
4
Application lapsed
3
Poor earnings record
3
Poor financial condition
3
Too many promotional sales
2
Withdrew from SEC
2
Excessive number of nonqualified shares
2
Lack of testing of product
I
Excessive compensation of officers
I
Cheap stock
I
Shares sold in advance of effective date
I
Conversion of funds by officers
I

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 3, Art. 3
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:3

There is a definite correlation between SEC approval and approval in
Arizona. Of the 260 approvals, 249 either had SEC approval or had their
Arizona registration become effective upon issuance of SEC approval. In
many of the files, the telex from the attorney's office to the Securities Division
could be found and the Arizona registration became effective on the day of
that telex receipt. Of the withdrawals, seventy-two did not have SEC approval.
These issuers had registered with the SEC because their offerings were interstate. Thus, it can be concluded that there is a greater chance of approval in
Arizona if there is effective SEC registration."
These findings raise a major policy issue. A large majority of approvals
had either SEC approval or had their Arizona registration become effective
upon SEC approval. Similarly, most offerings without Arizona approval did
not have SEC approval. Therefore, the efficacy of merit review is called into
question, because SEC review is based on disclosure standards.75
There was a significant size difference between the companies which obtained approval and those which withdrew. Of the approved companies, there
was an average asset figure of $76,878,550. Of the withdrawals, the average
asset figure was $28,788,706. The nearly $50,000,000 difference indicates that
many small firms are having difficulty obtaining registration approval. 76
This finding supports the hypothesis that the merit review process
discriminates against small issuers. The effect of the merit review is to impede
economic progress and business development by preventing small, capitalshort businesses from raising capital in the marketplace. Merit review standards can thus create barriers to a free enterprise system.77
There was also a significant price per share difference. The average price
per share for the approved offerings was $14.63, whereas the average price per
share for the offerings withdrawn was $7.64. However, there was no significant difference in the size of the offerings. The average offering size for the approved firms was 2,295,893 shares. The average offering size for the
withdrawals was 2,663,800 shares. The price differential may be due to the
Underwriter withdrew
Failure to provide additional information
Insufficient promoters' equity
Financial risk on investors
Deficiency in share and working capital

Excessive warrants and options
Differences in public and investor offerings
Patent infringement
Inequitable voice in control
Other
"Id. at 16.
751d.
71Id.

at 17.
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fact that firms which withdrew were smaller and did not have an established
earnings record to warrant a higher price."8
There appears to be a correlation between an offering being seasoned and
the chances of approval. Of the 260 offerings which were approved, 165 were
seasoned. Of the 90 withdrawals, 37 were unseasoned.79
There seems to be no correlation between whether an issue is underwritten and whether it will be approved. The number of approvals which were
underwritten was 159. The number of withdrawals which were underwritten
was 49 or over half. Thus, the presence of an underwriter is no indication that
approval will be obtained. 0
The applications for registrations in Arizona require the applicants to list
approvals or denials in other states. The most frequently mentioned states in
which applicants had obtained approval were (in order of the number of times
they were mentioned): California, Illinois, Texas, Minnesota, Michigan,
Wisconsin, Iowa and New Mexico.' These same states were also the ones most
frequently mentioned when the applicant was asked to reveal the states that
denied registration. On the withdrawn applications, the same states were also
mentioned in the same frequency as to approval. To assess the economic impact of merit review, a statistical comparison was made of companies that had
been approved to issue common stock securities and companies that had
withdrawn their request to issue common stock securities in Arizona from
1976 to 1979. Only common stock issues were examined, in order to maintain
as much homogeneity among the securities as possible. 2 Other securities such
as debt and preferred stock have many different provisions and privileges and
are therefore not directly comparable.
Securities that were withdrawn were subsequently sold in other states. 3
"Id. at 18.
"Id. A seasoned offering is one by a company that has previously issued a public offering of the same type of
security.

"'Id.
"Id. at 18-19. These states have the most detail in their registration regulations. See supra notes 16 to 21 and
accompanying text.
"Id. at 19-20. Common stock data is more easily obtained from publications. The problem of mail survey
response and statistical insignificance is reduced.
"The financial performance measure used was holding period return as shown in equation (1).

T
Pi.T +
HPRT

E Dj.t
t=l
-I
t

Pj~o

where HPRT = holding period return where T is the holding period which was 1, 2, 3, and 4 years after the offering.
PjT = the average of the high and low price for security j for year T adjusted for stock splits
and stock dividends.
D,1
= dividends paid in year , adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends.
= the offering price for security j.
Pi
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The statistical analysis indicated that the withdrawn group had a significantly
higher return in year 1 than the approved group, while there were no significant differences between the two groups for years 2, 3, and 4. Although these
results cannot be generalized because of the small sample sizes for the withdrawn group, these results suggest that the withdrawn firms did as well financially as the approved group and even better in year 1.11 Accordingly, Arizona's merit review process did create a barrier to the free flow of capital to a
small group of viable firms. Although methodologies are always subject to criticism, the Kudla and Jennings findings demonstrate that there may be some arbitrariness and over-zealousness in the application of merit review standards.
III. UNSPOKEN ALTERNATIVES TO MERIT REVIEW - GETTING AROUND IT

Although much has been written in favor of retaining merit review, there
are very few practitioners or business people who hold much respect for or
faith in the merit review system. Empirical studies aside, those in the trenches
are not happy with merit review. However, these same people are also well
aware of the "sacredness" of merit review.85 For some reason, even with all evidence considered, and other problems aside, merit review is deemed above reproach, and a major movement is required to change the philosophies of merit
review states. Recognizing the difficulty of eliminating or even changing merit
review standards, those affected by it have undertaken alternatives to alleviate
The average holding period return was computed as shown in equation (2)
N
T = 1, 2, 3, and4
E HPRjT
HPRT =

j= 1

n

(2)

where n is the number of securities which had available data.
Id. at 19-20.
If the average holding period returns were significantly higher for the approvals than for the withdrawals,
this result would be consistent with merit review being efficacious. If, however, the withdrawn group, then
serious consideration should be given to revamping the securities laws. id. at 20.
"A financial analysis was made of the approved group and withdrawn group. The financial data was obtained from a mail survey. Based on 41 approved firms and 12 withdrawn firms, the withdrawn firms had a
statistically significant higher average holding period return one year after the offering, as compared to the
approved group. There were no significant differences in returns for the groups 2, 3, and 4 years after the offering. This finding is consistent with Arizona's merit review process impeding economic progress and
business development.
"For example, in the Arizona hearings on merit review standards the following testimony was offered by
Commissioner Royce Griffin, a regulator from Colorado, supra note 72:
I think it's really no coincidence that six states that are now known as free states - seven with Illinois, although Illinois has not been around long enough to have any experience yet. Those six states
are Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, New Jersey, New York and Nevada. It comes as no coincidence those
six states are also the base points for all the major frauds in this country.
The Climate that is created by a state that has no merit review not only attracts public offerings
that are registered with the SEC, it also attracts every other kind of securities crook in the country
who believes that, because you have no regulation, you also have no enforcement.
So when the market falls, as it has every time since 1969, this cyclical period, the people who are
hurt are not the promoters or the lawyers or the accountants who put the offerings together. They
have got their money in the initial run-up of the market. The people who are hurt - It is like musical
chairs. The last guy holding the stock losses. It is the small investor the state securities regulation is
supposed to protect.
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the effects of merit review. Alleviating those effects involves a slow trend
toward federalization of securities laws. Much is being undertaken to put more
control in the hands of the SEC and less control in the hands of state
regulators.
A.

Step One - Regulation D

Federal preemption is always an alternative in the field of securities. With
this in mind, many interest groups lobbied Congress for the Omnibus Small
Business Capital Formation Act of 1980.86 Section (c)(1) of the Act grants the
SEC the authority "to cooperate with any association composed of duly constituted representatives of State governments whose primary assignment is the
regulation of securities business within those States" for "the development of a
uniform exemption from registration for small issuers which can be agreed
upon among several States or between the States and the Federal Government."87
Pursuant to the Act, the SEC worked with NASAA 85 and developed
"15 U.S.C. § 77s 11985).
515 U.S.C. § 77s (c)(3)(1) (1981). The pertinent parts of the Act provide:
(2) It is the declared policy of this subsection that there should be greater Federal and State cooperation in securities matters, including (A) maximum effectiveness of regulation,
(B) maximum uniformity in Federal and State regulatory standards,
(C) minimum interference with the business of capital formation, and
(D) a substantial reduction in costs and paperwork to diminish the burdens of raising investment
capital (particularly by small business) and to diminish the costs of the administration of the
Government programs involved.
(3) The purpose of this subsection is to engender cooperation between the Commission, any such
association of State securities officials, and other duly constituted securities associations in the
following areas:
(A) the sharing of information regarding the registration or exemption of securities issues applied
for in the various States;
IB) the development and maintenance of uniform securities forms and procedures; and
(C) the development of a uniform exemption from registration for small issuers which can be
agreed upon among several States or between the States and the Federal Government. The
Commission shall have the authority to adopt such an exemption as agreed upon for Federal
purposes. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing preemption of State
law.
(4) In order to carry out these policies and purposes, the Commission shall conduct an annual conference as well as such other meetings as are deemed necessary, to which representatives from
such securities associations, securities self-regulatory organization, agencies, and private organizations involved in capital formation shall be invited to participate.
(5) For fiscal year 1982, and for each of the three succeeding fiscal years, there are authorized to be
appropriated such amounts as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the policies, provisions, and purposes of this subsection. Any sums so appropriated shall remain available until expended.
Note that by this Act, Congress made it clear that federal law did not preempt state regulation. Id. at §
77s(c)(3)(C).

UNASAA is the North American Securities Administrators Association and consists of securities administrators from all states, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico and Guam. Before the adoption of the NASAA
name in 1957, it was known as the National Association of State Securities Administrators. Prifti, supra
Published
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Regulation D.89 The purpose of Regulation D was two-fold: to clarify the
federal securities exemptions and to encourage the states to establish uniform
standards by adopting a set of exemptions acceptable to the state regulators.9"
One and one-half years after the SEC's adoption of Regulation D, about 28
states had adopted exemption standards coordinated with Regulation D, 9' and
NASAA had officially endorsed the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption
(ULOE).9 The regulatory swing is dramatic. The cooperation on Regulation D
" 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to 230.506 (1985). Regulation D was not promulgated quickly. Originally the exemptions existed as Rules 240, 242 and the original Rule 146. However those rules were refined to their present
form, see 17 C.F.R. at §§ 230.502 to 230.506.
'Securities and Exchange Commission and North American Securities Administrators Association Conference on Federal-State Securities Regulation, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 83,610.
9
The following twenty-five jurisdictions have exemptions which are compatible with both Rule 505 and 506
offerings: Alaska, (3 AA 08,501, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) I 8,448A; Arizona, (Rule 14-4-125, I BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 1 9,536; Colorado (§ 11-51-113(o), I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 13,113; Connecticut, (Reg.
36.500-22(b)(9)(I 1), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP., (CCH) J 14,422; District of Columbia, Delaware, (Rule 9(b)(9)(1 1),
IA BLUE SKY L. REP., (CCH) 15,419B; Georgia, (Rule 590-4-5-.01), IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 118,441,
Idaho, (Rule 27, IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 126,426; Kansas, (§ 17-1262(o), Rule 81-5-6,) IA BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) I 26,405E; Louisiana, (Article D), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 129,511; Maryland, (Rule. 15),
I A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 130,441; Massachusetts, (Reg. Section 14.402(1), IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
131,472; Michigan, (Rule 803.7) I A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) I 32,483A; Missouri, (Rule 30-54.210) 2 BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) I 35,520A; Montana, (§ 36-10-105(16), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) = 36,105; (Rule
6.10.120), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 36,430; Nebraska, (Rule 77), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 37,415;
New Jersey, (as to offerings other than real estate syndications) (§ 49:2-60(b), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1
40,125; New York, (as to offerings other than real estate syndications), (§ 359ff) 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1
42,132; Oklahoma, (§ 401 (b)(9)(C), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 41,151; (Rule 401 (b)(9), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 1 46,414; Oregon, (Rule 815-36-500), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 47,634, South Carolina, (Rule
113-21), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 151,521; Tennessee, (Rule 0780-4-2-.04), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) I
54,414, Vermont, (§ 9-4204(13), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 58,104; Reg., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
58,404; Virginia, (§ 13.1-514(14), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 160,114; Rule 503, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
57,413; West Virginia, (Rule
1 60,439; Utah, (Rule A-67-03-14.2n-I), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
15.05(b)(9), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 63,496. Kansas and Tennessee follow NASAA and limit their exemptions to Rule 505. Colorado and New York regulate only intrastate offerings (where Regulation D, exemptions apply only if the offering is interstate). Oregon and Alaska register by coordination-federal approval or exemption complies with their requirements.
The following states have exemptions based on the number of purchasers but the exemption does not
parallel Regulation D; hence, special structure would be necessary in these states:
Florida, 35 (§ 517.061(12), BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 17,106, (Rules 3E-5 - .05-.07); BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 1 17,445-7; Illinois, 35 (§ 137.4G), IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,123; Iowa, 35 (§ 502.203(9), IA
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,113; Minnesota, 35 (§ 80A. 15(h), IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 133,115, Reg.
2875.0180, IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 33,408; Mississippi, 35 (§ 75-71-203(9) and (10), 2 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 134,146; Nevada, 34 (90,140), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 38,125; Pennsylvania, 25 & 203(d),
2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 48,113; South Dakota, 25 for domestic corporations, 5 for other issuers (§
47-31-86.1, 86.4) 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 52,224, 52,227, 52,835.
States with only Rule 506 exemptions are:
Alabama, (Rule 830-X-6-I ), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 17471; Arkansas, (§ 67-1248(b) (14), 1 BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 110,114; Interpretative Opinion, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 10,661; California, (§ 25,102(f) I
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 11,133; Rules 260.102.12-14), I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 11 11,780A-C; Indiana,
(§23-2-1-2(b)(10), IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 24,102; Kentucky, (Rule 808), IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
1 27,415; Maine, (§ 32,874-A(c), BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 29,124; North Carolina, (Rule 12.06), 2 BLUE
45,103; Texas, (Rule
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 43,416; Ohio, (§ 1707, 030), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
109.4(1I), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 155,554; Washington (WAC § 460-44A-501-503,506), 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 161,752-61,757; Wisconsin, (§ 551.23(19), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 164,113.
The other states (California, Hawaii, Wyoming, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New Mexico and
Rhode Island) have peculiar exemption requirements.
Ten jurisdictions (Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, D.C., Indiana, New York, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Oregon and Washington) recognize Rule 504 exemptions.
2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss3/3
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is the first time the states, as a group, have shown willingness to defer to
federal standards. 93 Furthermore, the movement toward federal regulation is
some acknowledgement by state regulators that there are some types of investments that do not require state merit or other types of review. Furthermore, both Regulation D and the ULOE move in the direction of unlimited offers and sales9" to those investors who do not require protection.9"
B.

Step Two -

Proposed Uniform Securities Act Reforms

The reporter's memorandum on the draft of the Uniform Securities Act
(USA) called the changes in relation to state regulation a process of "modernoted: "it would not be inconsistent with the regulatory objectives of this exemption for a state to elect to accept Rule 506 offerings within the gambit of this exemption."
Furthermore, in spite of the recognition of 501-503 and 505 (and 506 by implication) exemptions, the
ULOE imposes additional requirements for state exemptions:
(I) No Commissions to unregistered persons;
(2) Restrictions on issuers criminal background;
(3) Form D filing requirements;
(4) Restrictions on non-accredited investors.
There is substantial variation in state versions of the ULOE.
In May, 1984, the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association
recommended adoption of the ULOE (with some modifications).
93

Historically, the swing to federal standards appears to be part of a slow movement. The first state blue sky
law appeared in 1911 - prior to the existence of any federal legislation (Kansas, KAN. L. 9199 ch. 133 § 5
(1911). Many states patterned their blue sky laws after the Kansas law. The Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 encourage new state attitudes and a deference toward federal regulation.
During the 1960's and 1970's, state power grew with the use of merit review. At this time, the pendulum is
swinging back to the federal arena.
4
1 Section 230.505(a) of Regulation D permits offers and sales to an unlimited number of "accredited investors." Id. at § 230.505(b)(2)(ii). (See infra note 95 for a definition). Some states already have such unlimited sales to "accredited investors." For example, see MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 451.802(b)(9)(d(5) (West
1983); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 551.23(7) (West 1976). The ULOE unlimited offers and sales also apply to accredited investors, I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 5294 (Sept. 21, 1983).
5
The SEC definition of "accredited investor" is found in Regulation D and includes the following:
(a) Institutional investors (banks, employee benefit plans).
(b) Private business development companies;
(c) Tax exempt organizations with assets exceeding $5,000,000;
(d) Directors, executive officers and general partners of the issuer;
(e) Investors who purchase at least $150,000 of the securities (provided such purchase is not more
than 20% of net worth);
(f) Natural persons with individual or joint net worth exceeding $10,000,000;
(g) Natural persons with income exceeding $200,000 in each of the past two years; and
(h) An entity in which all equity holders qualify for any classification under accredited investor.
See. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (a)(I)-(8) (1985).
The USA defines "financial or institutional investor" as including [but not limited to]:
(i) a depository institution;
tii) an insurance company;
(iii) a separate account of an insurance company;
(iv) an investment company as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940;
(v) an employee pension, profit-sharing or benefit plan if the plan has total assets in excess of
$5,000,000; or if investment decisions are made by a plan fiduciary, as defined in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which is either a broker-dealer registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, an investment adviser registered or exempt from
registration under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, a depository institution, or an insurance company; and
(vi) any other institutional buyer.
PublishedSecurities
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
Act § 105(5) (1985).1986
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' and "expedition."97
nization"96

1. Section 305 -

Registration by Filing

The most dramatic change in the new Act comes in Section 302 entitled
Registration by Filing.9" This section would permit issues which meet certain
specific criteria" to become effective automatically at the state level once the
"Reporter's Memorandum, Uniform Securities Act, August 3, 1984 draft, p. 4.
97
1d. at p. 5.
98
There are actually two types of registration available at the state level - registration by filing and registration by qualification. Registration by filing is automatic registration that requires paperwork but involved no
action on the part of the administrator. Registration by qualification is a term from § 304 of the Uniform
Securities Act (1985). Registration by qualification is non-automatic registration requiring review of
materials by the administrators. Registration by qualification is used in those states where there is no
registration by coordination or in other states where there is no SEC simultaneous registration (see supra,
notes 8 and 9 for a list of the coordination states).
"The criteria for registration by filing are as follows:
(a) ...
(1)the issuer is organized under the laws of the United States or a state or, if the issuer is not organized under the laws of the United States or a state, it has appointed a duly authorized
agent in the United States for service of process;
(2) the issuer has actively engaged in business operations in the United States for a period of at
least 36 consecutive calendar months immediately before the filing of the federal registration
statement;
(3) the issuer has registered a class of equity securities under Sections 12(b) or 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which class of securities is held of record by 500 or more persons;
(4) the issuer has:
(i) (A) a total net worth of $4,000,000; or (B) a total net worth of $2,000,000 and net pretax income from operations before allowances for extraordinary items, for at least 2 of
the 3 preceding fiscal years;
(ii) not less than 400,000 units of the class of security registered under Section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 held by the public, excluding securities held by officers
and directors of the issuer, underwriters and persons beneficially owning 10% or more of
that class of security; and
(iii) outstanding warrants and options held by the underwriters and executive officers and directors of the issuer in an amount not exceeding 10% of the total number of shares to be
outstanding after completion of the offering of the securities being registered;
(5) the issuer has been subject to the requirements of Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and has filed all the material required to be filed under Sections 13 and 14 of that act
for at least 36 calendar months immediately before the filing of the federal registration statement and the issuer has filed in a timely manner all reports required to be filed during the 12
calendar months immediately before the filing of the federal registration statement;
(6) for a period of at least 30 days during the 3 months preceding the offering of the securities
registered there have been at least 4 market makers for the class of equity securities registered
under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
(7) each of the underwriters participating in the offering of the security, and each broker-dealer
who will offer the security in this State, is a member of, or is subject to the rules of fair practice of, a national association of securities dealers with respect to the offering and the underwriters have contracted to purchase the securities offered in a principal capacity;
(8) the aggregate commissions or discounts to be received by the underwriters will not exceed
10% of the aggregate price at which the securities being registered are offered to the public.
(9) neither the issuer nor any of its subsidiaries, since the end of the last fiscal year preceding the
filing of the registration statement, have:
(i) failed to pay a dividend or sinking fund installment on preferred stock;
(ii) defaulted on indebtedness for borrowed money; or
(iii) defaulted on the rental on one or more long-term leases;
which defaults in the aggregate are material to the financial position of the issuer and its subsidiaries, taken as a whole; and
(10) in the case of an equity security, the price at which the security will be offered to the public
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss3/3
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offering is declared effective by the SEC.
Naturally, this most dramatic change has generated the most dramatic
comments. The reporter's memorandum reflects the drafting Committee's
view that seasoned companies are being subjected to significant state review
processes while the cost of such intense review is not justified by the need for
protection of investors.' °0 Although the merit review procedures remained in
the Act, such inclusions are an option. The standards for merit review range
from "work a fraud upon purchasers"'' to "unfair, unjust or inequitable" prohibitions.

2

The Sub Committee on the Uniform Securities Act of the American Bar
Association issued a strong statement in favor of Section 302 when it was proposed (as section 305):1o3
We view the inclusion of Section 30121 as a significant forward step in
coordinating and integrating federal and state securities regulation, and
probably the single most important change to the Act. The SEC and
various of its advisory committees have devoted substantial effort over
(b) A registration statement under this section must contain the following information and be accompanied by the following documents in addition to the information specified in Section 305(c) and
the consent to service of process required by Section 708:
(1)a statement demonstrating eligibility for registration by filing;
(2) the name, address, and form of organization of the issuer;
3) with respect to a person on whose behalf a part of the offering is to be made in a non-issuer
distribution: name and address; the amount of securities of the issuer held by the person as of
the date of the filing of the registration statement; and a statement of the reasons for making
the offering;
(4) a description of the security being registered; and
(5) a copy of the latest prospectus filed with the registration statement under and satisfying the
requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933.
(c) If the information and documents required to be filed by subsection (b) have been on file with the
[Administrator] for at least [5] business days, or any shorter period as the lAdministrator, by rule
or order, allows and the applicable registration fee has been paid before the effectiveness of the
federal registration statement, a registration statement under this section automatically becomes
effective concurrently with the effectiveness of the federal registration statement. If the federal
registration statement becomes effective before the conditions in this subsection are satisfied and
they are not waived, the registration statement becomes effective when the conditions are
satisfied. The registrant shall promptly notify the [Administrator] by telephone or telegram of the
date and time when the federal registration statement became effective and the content of the
price amendment, if any, and shall file promptly a post effective amendment containing the information and documents in the price amendment. The [Administrator] shall promptly acknowledge
receipt of notification and effectiveness of the registration statement as of the date and time the
registration statement became effective with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
JSA, supra note 87, § 302 (originally proposed § 305).
'The reporter's memorandum stated:
The preliminary deliberations of the Committee generated an initial consensus that there are a number of seasoned companies for which the costs of detailed securities review at the state level may not
be justified vis-a-vis the additional benefits achieved by such review for the protection of investors.
teporter's memorandum, supra note 96, at 5.
'Section 306(a)(2)(v).
2
Alternate § 306(a)(2)v).
3

COMMENTS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA.
ION STATE REGULATION OF SECURITIES COMMITTEE CONCERNING PROPOSED REVISION To THE UNIFORM

July 24, 1984. A copy 1986
is available through
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,

ECURITIES ACT.
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the past several years to bring about a structure of federal securities
regulation which focuses regulatory resources upon those issuers and offerings which present the greatest potential threat to investors. Section
30[2] carries that concept to its logical extension by providing a
mechanism for state administrators to permit national offerings of seasoned companies to be processed routinely, thereby enabling scarce
regulatory resources to be applied where they are most needed, in the
close scrutiny of offerings by unseasoned companies and in the investigation and prosecution of violators." °4
The subcommittee's view of Section 30[21 is further praised as a reflection
of the "fact that today's sophisticated financial markets quickly absorb and adjust for information on public companies and that those markets change quickly, necessitating rapid consummation of major transactions by seasoned comin the long process to
panies."' ° The new section is deemed "a necessary step
1°6
system.
registration
securities
nation's
our
modernize
NASAA submitted its comments on the then proposed Section 30[2.07
Their major concern was Section 302, and their comments refer to the section
as a "misguided attempt to carve out from appropriate review at the state level
certain so-called 'seasoned' companies," and the proposal as "fatally flawed."' 0
Their concerns are:
(1) an inadequate definition of "seasoned" companies;
(2) NASAA is currently preparing an additional exemption to cover
issuers listed and reporting under the National Market System of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
(3) 30[2] makes the USA (along) with other sections too weak to be effective. 109
NASAA also expressed a fear of "shell" companies using the procedure.
"Shell" companies are those that do not meet the public reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but" will register to take
advantage of section 302."'
"Id.at 20.
"5 d. at 21. The comments note that any potential efficiency the SEC might achieve is not realized if the
same degree of efficiency is not present at the state level. Id.
"MId. at 21. The opinion concludes with a "strong recommendation" for adoption. Id. at 23-4.
'07Open Letter to the Members of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws from
the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA) regarding the revised draft of the
Uniform Securities Act to be given a First Reading in July 1984. A copy is available from AKRON LAW
REVIEW.

'1d. at 2.
'"Id.at 2-3. The letter refuses support by a unanimous vote of NASAA's members. Id. at 3.
1015 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78111 (1983).
"'However, Section 302 does have the additional requirement that the issuer "has been actively engaged in
business operation" for at least three years preceding the offering. Furthermore, § 302(a)(3) and (4)(i)(A)-(B)
require the issuer to have a registered class of securities held of record by 500 persons and provisions regardhttps://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss3/3
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ing net assets. The ABA subcommittee feels these additional requirements eliminate the worry about shell
companies.
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NASAA expressed further concern that Section 302 would narrow the
functions of state administrators."' The ABA's response was that these functions would not be narrowed but instead be focused on those offerings most in
need of review." 3
2. Sections 401-403 -

Uniform Exemptions

Sections 402-403 of the Act are a significant indication of the intent of the
USA to allow state administrators to bring their regulations and exemptions in
line with federal standards."' The sections when proposed won praise from the
ABA and no objections were voiced by the NASA.A. Although the ULOE that
resulted from the cooperation of NASAA, the ABA and the SEC was intended
to result in uniformity, there was much discretion given to the states, and the
result has been a "patch-work pattern" of state requirements."'
3. Part VI -

Increasing State Enforcement Authority

Part VI of the USA expands the scope of the Act and the administrators'
authority by adding administrative remedies such as cease and desist orders,"6
as well as civil" 7 and criminal penalties."' In addition, the Act gives more teeth
for enforcement to the private sector through the incorporation of damage formulas allowing ease of investor proof and recovery." 9 These expanded
penalties are consistent with the reformers' stated policy of having the states
act in those areas where their regulation is most effective, while removing the
problems of inconsistent and, at times, arbitrary registration approval. 2 '
IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In spite of opinions to the contrary,' there is both empirical and practical
"'Subcommittee Report, supra note 103, at 23.
11id. at 23. The ABA also noted opposition to NASAA's exemption for securities listed on exchanges. Their
reasoning was that there are many seasoned, reporting companies which happen not to be listed on the national exchanges.
"'Section 403(b) allows an administrator to promulgate by rule a "limited offering transactional exemption
that will further the objectives of compatibility with the exemptions from securities registration authorized
by the Securities Act of 1933 and uniformity amount the States."
"'Subcommittee Report, supra note 103, at 32-3. For example, FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(Supp. 1986) provides an exemption with no offering price limitation, a 35-investor limitation (not counting accredited investors, relative and affiliates and no requirements on investment sophistication.
"'Section 602(a)(ii). Licenses can also be revoked and brokers and dealers unsured. Id. at §§ 602-603.
"'Section 603. The civil penalties are up to $2,500 for a single violation and $25,000 for multiple violations.
Id. at § 603(a)(1)(ii).
"'Section 604.
"'Section 605 provides for penalties relating to the securities' value as well as interest, costs and attorney's
fees. id. at § 605(a).
"'0See supra notes 100 and Il13.
"'See Makens, supra note 23 in which the author noted: "It is time to stop spouting generalities and filling
the air with emotional outbursts. If there are problems with merit regulation, they should be documented
and shared with NASAA so that attempts can be made to correct the situation. It is easy to be a critic. It ineffort
and often less thought."
volves
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evidence that the state regulation of securities' registration may not be as effective as it is alleged to be, and instead may be an impediment to raising capital.
Because the states and NASAA have been relatively unwilling to yield, the
ABA, the SEC, Congress and other groups have sought methods of circumvention. The circumvention is coming by giving the federal government more
authority while streamlining the states' role in securities registration. In short,
if the state administrators do not take the appropriate steps to engage in meaningful and fair regulation, the authority will be changed or taken away.
Federalism has proven to be an answer to sometimes arbitrary and always
time-consuming state registration. NASAA's reaction to allowing streamlined
registration for seasoned companies is an indication of the administrators'
desire to retain registration approval authority regardless of need or efficacy.
If state regulators do not become more aware of the need for capital and
the changed structure of the securities market, their regulatory grip could
strangle capital ventures growth, unless and until federalism removes their
authority.
Several groups need to become involved in the effort to achieve a coordinated and more effective system of regulation. NASAA will need to become
more flexible in its approach to Uniform Acts. Compromise is necessary to
achieve some form of continuity. Recognizing market realities would be
helpful in updating existing state securities laws. The SEC could be more involved in encouraging cooperation and providing assurance of its role as a
force for full disclosure in an efficient market. The ABA has taken a very
positive position and answered objections to streamlining with articulate
responses. However, all three groups have failed in their study efforts.
One of the reasons for so much debate over merit vs. disclosure and state
vs. federal regulation is the lack of tangible evidence. A multistate study funded and staffed jointly by the organizations should be undertaken to discern the
following:
(1) the differences in issuers and offerings in merit vs. non-merit states;
(2) the consistency of application of merit review standards by administrators;
(3) the costs of compliance in state registrations;
(4) the differences in performance of seasoned vs. unseasoned offerings;
(5) a quantification of the number of frauds investigated, uncovered and
prosecuted in merit vs. non-merit states.
Before the pendulum swings to a federal system of full disclosure and the
disappearance of what may be effective state regulation, some answers are
criticized allthree empirical studies of merit review that offered some tangible evidence of effectiveness and
dismissed the studies as "narrowly focused," "unsuccessful," "questionable" and "unsupported." Id. at
455-57. Makens also makes several personal but undocumented evaluations of the ability of regulators to set
aside prejudices and be fair. Id. at 450.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss3/3
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needed. To date, no one has provided an in-depth set of facts regarding where
securities regulation stands and what it does. With appropriate evidence, the
respective groups may be able to agree on a regulatory system with balance one which provides protection for the investor without the destruction of
capital sources for business.
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